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Abstract 
 
Collective bargaining is closely related to social policy making to the extent that 
the outcomes of the former inform and influence social policy agenda. It is widely 
held, however, that trade unions in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) do not have a 
strong bargaining position and thus exert little impact on policy decisions. This paper 
challenges the view of CEE labour as a uniformly weak actor. It argues that CEE 
unions’ ability to shape the bargaining agenda and social policies depends largely on 
the degree of privatisation, which overlaps with sectoral divisions. We find that 
unions in exposed sectors are unable to oppose greater flexibility even when there are 
no considerable wage gains, whereas workers in protected sectors manage to 
maintain their status and at times even enhance their welfare, both in terms of higher 
wages and better working conditions.  
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Introduction 
 
Welfare states across Western Europe have been under pressure and faced new 
policy challenges, such as reconciliation of work and family life, elderly care, and 
obsolete skill profiles. Despite falling membership numbers and country-specific 
difficulties (Martin and Ross, 1999), trade unions in developed market economies 
have largely retained their influence the course of welfare state restructuring. In 
addition to their function as political actors, they have been able to shape social 
policy responses by bringing certain issues onto the bargaining table (Frege and 
Kelly, 2003). There is evidence that not only wages and working conditions, but also 
other policy elements, such as retirement schemes, vocational training and education 
are subject to negotiations between social partners (see, for instance, Haipeter and 
Lehnhoff, 2009 and d’Arci et al., 2009). Consequently, both the degree and direction 
of Western European welfare states’ restructuring can be to a large extent regarded as 
an outcome of collective bargaining. 
In the aftermath of their transition from centrally-planned to market economy, 
Central and Eastern European states faced even greater socio-economic imbalances, 
and were pressed hard to address multiple and sometimes contradictory policy issues 
such as privatisation and restructuring, job security, pension system reforms and 
poverty reduction. It was widely argued by the literature, however, that neither the 
new institutional environment nor the legacy of socialism offered a fertile ground for 
the development of Western-style social partnerships (see, for instance, Ost and 
Crowley, 2001, and Bohle and Greskovits, 2004). Even formally established tripartite 
institutions were used by governments mainly as means of legitimising the already 
made policy choices rooted in neoliberal economic principles (Ost, 2000; Avdagic, 
2005). In the light of these arguments, one could expect that CEE unions will find it 
hard to make use of strategies available to their Western European counterparts and 
actively shape the collective bargaining agenda. By the same token, they should be 
also incapable of influencing their countries’ social policy reform agenda.  
In this paper, we challenge this view of CEE labour as a uniformly weak actor. 
Instead, we argue unions’ ability to shape both the collective bargaining process and 
the course of welfare state restructuring, depends to a large extent on the degree of 
privatisation in a given sector. As a proxy for the extent of privatisation, we use a 
dichotomy between exposed (private) and protected (public) sectors, which so far 
has been applied to account for diversity in macroeconomic performance (Crouch, 
1993; Franzese, 2002; Garrett and Way, 2000; Traxler and Brandl, 2009). 
Accordingly, we claim that CEE labour organisations in the exposed (private) sectors 
are unable to avoid greater flexibility even when there are no considerable wage 
gains, whereas unions in protected (public) sectors manage to maintain their status 
and at times enhance their welfare, both in terms of higher wages and better working 
conditions.  
We test the above argument using empirical evidence from Poland and Serbia. 
The two countries differ in terms of the degree of privatisation and their legacies 
regarding the role of trade unions in the transition process, but in both cases labour 
was found to be in a weak position vis-à-vis both capital and the state (Ost and 
Crowley, 2001). Our case studies show that despite the past and current differences, 
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collective bargaining practices in the two countries display systematic inter-sectoral 
variation. Both in Poland and Serbia, public (protected) sector unions are capable of 
affecting the collective bargaining outcomes and welfare policies, whereas in the 
private (exposed) sectors, the course of changes is set mainly by the employers and 
there is little input from the employee and/or state side. Our findings are based on 
the analysis of collective agreements, press reports and internal union reports, as well 
as interviews with labour union representatives.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes theoretical literature on 
cross-sectoral differences and outlines key characteristics of public and private sector 
unionism in CEE. It also presents our expectations regarding the type of issues 
tackled in collective bargaining and the extent of unions’ influence on the bargaining 
and social policy outcomes. Section 3 briefly goes over the methodology employed 
and confronts our expectations with empirical evidence from metalworking, 
education and healthcare sectors in Poland and Serbia. The final section concludes. 
 
 
Protected vs. Exposed Sectors and Bargaining Issues 
 
In CEE, collective bargaining remains an underdeveloped practice and industrial 
relations are less institutionalised than in the West. Nevertheless, there are grounds to 
expect systematic differences between the region’s protected and exposed sectors not 
only in terms of bargaining coverage and types of issues tackled by social partners in 
the course of negotiations, but also the extent to which unions are able to actively 
shape the outcome of bargaining over social policy aspects. This section outlines the 
dichotomy between exposed and protected sectors and uses the sectoral attributes to 
derive concrete expectations regarding collective bargaining practices in these two 
segments across the postcommunist region.  
The distinction between protected and exposed sectors is used in literature to 
display heterogeneity of interests on the labour’s side. Because the exposed sectors 
are subject to international competition and their competitiveness depends largely on 
the prices, inflationary wage demands would considerably harm them (Crouch, 1993). 
As a result, collective agreements concluded in these sectors tend to provide for wage 
restraints and inflation control. Traxler and Brandl (2009) further argue that exposed 
sectors’ pattern bargaining ensures wage moderation more successfully than peak 
level bargaining, since the former is driven by market rules while the latter is an 
outcome of the political game. In contrast, Schwartz (2001) asserts that workers in 
protected sectors derive their income streams mainly from regulations enforced by 
the government, and the limited degree of competition gives them a structurally 
favourable stance. Hence, they mainly aim at maintaining their granted rights and 
their monopoly position, and are ready to fiercely bargain over these at the expense 
of exposed sectors.  
One drawback of applying the above logic to CEE is the decentralised nature of 
the collective agreements in the region. The dominant bargaining level is the sector 
or the company (European Commission, 2008), and thus wage coordination is 
virtually impossible to be achieved nationally. Moreover, company level agreements 
are mostly signed in the public sector or in large private enterprises, and they are very 
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rarely found in small and medium sized firms, be it foreign or domestic. When 
compared across sectors, however, the difference in unionisation and collective 
bargaining coverage is striking; in the public sector, union density rates as well as 
bargaining coverage rates are much higher. Moreover, while in the private sector the 
dominant bargaining level is that of company, in the public sector unions are still able 
to engage in negotiations with social partners at higher organisational levels (for 
Poland, see Czarzasty, 2002, and Lizut, 2009). 
In addition to wage matters, our study focuses on a range non-wage issues 
having direct bearing on the formulation of welfare state policies, such as 
employment flexibility, employment-related benefits, restructuring and retirement 
programmes. Many of these issues are informed by the legacies of the previous 
regime. Socialism was a wage-earners’ society par excellence, in the sense that 
employment was a primary guarantee of social status, giving access to rights and 
benefits both within and outside the workplace (Castel, 2003). This provided a fairly 
rigid formulation of employment relations, with tight, seniority-based hierarchies, 
restrictive provisions for deployment of labour in terms of task allocation, and a wide 
range of social benefits linked to the workplace. Especially during the 1980s, CEE 
communist countries relied on this cushioning employment arrangement to 
compensate for devaluation of wage incomes through high inflation and frequent 
wage arrears. In the course of post-socialist transformation, rising unemployment 
levels and periods of fiscal austerity imposed strict wage discipline. It thus comes as 
no surprise that with economic stabilisation wages have soared to the fore in 
collective negotiations. 
Nevertheless, protective employment relations remained in the unions’ 
perceptions as “property rights” (Schwartz, 2001) and were also, at least until 
recently, partly enshrined in law. When privatisation gained momentum and majority 
of the enterprises were integrated into the market system, workers were often torn 
between safeguarding employment and maintaining or reinstituting the rights 
acquired under the previous regime. This meant that employment-related rights were 
upheld in collective agreements even if unions were perfectly aware that they will not 
be honoured, and reforms aimed at greater flexibilisation of working time or labour 
contracts were subject to significant resistance in principle, even though they became 
widespread in practice. In the aftermath of transition, both public and private sector 
unions sought to restore some of these rights and to improve wages and working 
conditions, but not all of them were successful in attaining this goal. We argue that 
structural factors and inter-sectoral differences in union strength altered the final 
bargaining agenda in relation to both wage and non-wage issues. Table 1 below 
outlines the main characteristics of labour organisations in exposed and protected 
segments of CEE economies and our expectations regarding unions’ ability to 
preserve and/or enhance employee welfare and collective bargaining practices across 
the two types of sectors. 
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Protected sectors 
 
Exposed sectors 
Union characteristics 
 
Relatively high union density; 
high potential for coordinated 
mobilisation and politicisation of 
protests 
 
Low union density; considerable 
fragmentation; problems with 
representativeness; low potential 
for coordinated mobilisation and 
politicisation of protests 
 
Employment security  
 
 
High 
 
Low 
Persistent unemployment 
Issues in collective  
negotiations  
Wage issues 
Non-wage issues (privatisation, 
early retirement schemes, 
working time) 
 
Wage issues 
Sporadically non-wage issues 
(working time flexibility, use of 
temporary workers, outsourcing) 
 
Unions’ influence on  the 
bargaining outcome over 
non-wage issues  
 
High 
 
Low 
Prevailing characteristic 
of non-wage issues in the 
sector 
Welfare-enhancing/ 
Status-preserving 
 
Cost-cutting 
 
Table 1. Union Characteristics and Expected Features of Collective Bargaining in 
Protected and Exposed Sectors in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
As can be seen from the above table, we expect that unions in the protected 
sectors to play an important role in shaping the agenda and contributing to 
employee-friendly bargaining outcome. High employment security in these sectors 
enables them to mobilise their members over a wider spectrum of demands, 
including both wage-and non-wage issues. Many of these issues are related to welfare 
reforms in these countries and especially those concerning the public sector. Also the 
outcome of the bargaining process impacted the flexibilisation and deregulation of 
labour and social policy. In contrast, trade unions in exposed industries have a much 
harder task to push through their demands in the course of collective bargaining. 
Weakness and fragmentation of labour organisations, combined with low 
employment security in the private sector and persistent high unemployment will 
limit unions’ activism in relation to wage issues. Non-wage issues might be expected 
play even a less important role in the negotiations, as the unions will be too weak to 
mobilise their constituencies over broader concerns unrelated to pay. Consequently, 
issues such as working time and organisation, the use of temporary workforce and 
the extent of outsourcing practices will be shaped primarily by the employers. 
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Inter-Sectoral Variation of Collective Bargaining in Poland and Serbia 
 
To test the above expectations, this section overviews issues commonly tackled 
in collective bargaining in Poland and Serbia in the period from late 1990s till 
present. The analysis of protected sectors is based on the systematic observation of 
education and health care sectors. The analysis of the exposed sectors draws 
primarily on examples from the metalworking sector. For Poland, the emphasis is put 
on the automobile industry, which is a significant employer and exporter, and has 
grown tremendously in recent years under the influence of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In Serbia, although the metalworking sector is still largely in the process of 
restructuring, it is one of the few private sectors where collective bargaining exists.  
We base our findings primarily on the analysis of press releases and union 
materials. We relied on Eironline news items and comparative studies published by 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
reports in the two countries’ biggest daily newspapers (Gazeta Wyborcza, Gazeta 
Prawna, Rzeczpospolita for the Polish case, Danas, Blic and news portal B92 Serbian 
case), and on information regarding current union activities posted on their Internet 
pages. For the Polish case, we conducted two telephone interviews with the high-
rank union officials of the biggest Polish teachers’ union ZNP and three telephone 
interviews with union leaders at MAN, Fiat and GM automotive plants. In Serbia we 
conducted personal interviews with the president of the biggest health union, SZSZ, 
and secretary for collective bargaining in SOS, as well as with the two advisors in the 
national council of Nezavisnost, and secretary in the economic department of 
CATUS. In metalworking, we also interviewed personally the president and secretary 
of the metalworkers’ union GSM (Nezavisnost) and the head of the regional council 
of SMS in Vojvodina. The differing levels of trade union organization targeted in the 
interviews reflect the specificity of collective bargaining regimes of the two country, 
and in each case, we selected our interviewees in line with the level at which the 
majority of agreements in a given country are concluded. The interviews were 
conducted between October 2009 and January 2010. 
In addition, we relied on the studies and internal reports produced by unions, 
which are included in the reference section. In the Serbian case we also reviewed the 
existing sectoral collective agreements since 1999 (1 agreement and one preparatory 
document in health, 5 agreements in education) comparing their terms with those of 
the Labour Code and the (in the meantime repealed) national collective agreement, 
especially in the sections regarding right to information, working time, holidays, 
dismissals and severance pay, wages and bonuses, financial assistance, and the status 
of trade unions.  
 
Exposed Sectors in Poland and Serbia 
 
 Poland 
Until the mid-2000s, union activism in exposed sectors was very low. In view of 
the precarious labour market situation, characterised by a low level of employment 
security and persistent high unemployment, unions refrained from raising wage 
issues. Instead, they accepted long periods of wage freeze and dismal working 
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conditions in order to protect employment. Since workers were afraid of job cuts, it 
was also difficult for existing organisations to keep their members and for newly 
created units to recruit activists. As a result, a vicious circle of trade union weakness 
and employee fear was sustained over many years following the systemic 
transformation. 
The situation changed only in the second half of the 2000s, when labour 
shortages resulting from the growing demand for qualified workforce and high 
emigration rates to the ‘old’ EU member states boosted the bargaining position of 
Polish labour. Accordingly, exposed sectors such as the electronic or the automotive 
industry witnessed a tide of wage increase demands, voiced by unions and backed up 
by the workforces tired of the belt-tightening policies pursued by the management. 
Collective disputes and strikes became commonplace (Meardi, 2007), as the 
overwhelming majority of workers would cast their votes in favour of protest actions 
during strike balloting. In certain cases, unions made particularly bold wage increase 
claims: in 2007, for instance, the local Solidarność unit at GM/Opel demanded the 
pay hike of 1.000 PLN (approx. 250 euro) for each worker, representing 30% of 
basic pay. At FIAT, on the other hand, Solidarność sought to level wages at the two 
Polish units with that at FIAT’s Italian plants. All in all, even if initial unions’ 
proposals were rejected, pay increases often exceeded 5-15%. 
A protest wave of 2007 also motivated automotive unions to coordinate their 
actions at the sectoral level. In October 2007, plant-level Solidarność activists from 
Silesia, the biggest automotive cluster in Poland, signed an agreement to exchange 
information on collective bargaining at their factories and coordinate protests across 
the region. They also urged employers to engage in constructive social dialogue at the 
sectoral level. In the absence of legally binding provisions regulating sectoral-level 
bargaining, however, the unionists’ call met no reaction on the side of the 
management (Eironline, 2007). 
In contrast with wage issues, non-wage items such as work organisation, health 
and safety were considerably less interesting for workers. Without the constituency 
support, in turn, it was difficult for the unions to push thought the employee-friendly 
solutions during the enterprise-level collective negotiations. The deputy chair of 
enterprise-level Solidarność unit at GM/Opel presents this rank-and-file mobilisation 
problem as follows: 
 
“The company is aware that there are certain topics for which I can win the workforce. 
And pay is such a controversial topic. As a matter of fact, people don’t give a damn about 
health and safety issues … the employer knows it and neglects the issue [‘bimba sobie’]. 
But he is serious when it comes to money as he knows that the people will move [i.e 
mobilise]” (Interview OPEL, 2009). 
 
Due to weak rank-and-file support, company-level unions could not actively 
shape the bargaining agenda relating to non-wage issues. As a result, non-wage topics 
would often be decided unilaterally by the management and designed in the first 
place to cut expenditures and boost productivity, at the expense of working 
conditions and workers’ personal welfare. Working time is the most prominent 
example of a domain that featured abuses by the management. Although labour code 
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defines the maximum working time and the minimum overtime work premia, many 
employers either stuck to the absolute minimum standards or violated legislative 
provisions, knowing that penalties were low enough. Some companies attempted to 
prolong working time reference periods or, like bus producer MAN, to introduce 
working time accounts - an arrangement increasing working time flexibility typical for 
the German industrial relations system but illegal in Poland (Interview MAN, 2009). 
Another interesting phenomenon, which became common inter alia at the Polish 
branch of FIAT, was the extension of overtime work options. Since the basic wage 
was relatively low, many employees used the opportunity to earn extra money 
through overtime work. At the same time, trade unions had a hard time mobilising 
the workers’ support for regular pay rise negotiations. (Interview FIAT, 2009). 
Regarding health and safety and working environment issues, labour 
organisations intervened not only in reaction to workplace accidents, but also tried to 
improve the working environment on a daily basis. Union demands in this regard 
included, the creation of a new canteen and a parking lot, the construction of 
additional changing rooms or the improvement of heating systems. As in the case of 
working time, however, final decisions regarding working environment 
reorganisation were taken by the management.  
Last, but not least, unions often appealed to the employer to minimise 
outsourcing practices and the use of temporary workers. The plant-level Solidarność 
at Volkswagen Poznań, for instance, staged an anti-outsourcing campaign in the fall 
of 2007, while their counterparts from GM/Opel in Gliwice made use of their cross-
border links with the company’s European Works Council (also known as European 
Employee Forum, EEF) to preclude the takeover of cockpit and door production by 
external companies. In the same vein, plant-level Metalowcy unionists at the Poznań 
MAN plant tried to convince the management that the use of temporary workers 
might adversely impact the quality of bus production, which required high levels of 
technical qualification and manual precision. The company accepted the unionists’ 
claims in a period of labour shortage, but hired temporary workers once again in 
2008, when the labour market situation improved (Interview MAN, 2009). 
 
Serbia 
The definition of “exposed” sector in Serbia is somewhat ambiguous, and is used 
here to broadly refer to those enterprises which are not part of government-run 
social or public services. Within this sector, however, there are many large companies 
which in spite of all privatisation efforts remain publicly owned, and although in 
principle they compete on open markets and are thus “exposed” to competition, they 
are effectively being kept afloat by government subsidies. As a consequence of this 
incomplete privatisation process, we can distinguish between three groups exposed 
sector companies, each presenting different challenges to unions and forcing them to 
focus on different issues. Regardless of the divisions in the exposed sector, unlike in 
Poland, where a steady influx of FDI and a massive outflow of workforce have 
tightened the labour markets and strengthened workers’ bargaining position, 
employment in Serbia’s exposed sectors is still in free fall. Since 2001 the 
manufacturing sector lost around 40% of its workforce (around 250.000 workers), 
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setting employment security and management of redundancies among the highest 
priorities of trade unions.  
There are first of all companies still in the process of privatisation in Serbia. In 
the metalworking sector, this group accounts for a very large portion of employment, 
consisting mainly of big companies and parts of former conglomerates at various 
stages of restructuring. Indeed, in terms of union influence this group is doubly 
significant, as many of these companies used to be union strongholds in the past and 
maintain relatively high levels of membership. Most of them, however, are in a dire 
business condition and their unions are chiefly concerned with ensuring that the 
privatisation deals include decent severance packages for workers who are to become 
redundant. Although they go by the name of “social programmes” these redundancy 
measures mostly consists of negotiating severance pays above the legal minimum and 
very rarely entail some kind of re-employment or retaining programmes (SMS, 2009). 
Most privatisation contracts also contain the clause of maintaining the employment 
levels for at least one year after the change of ownership (APS, 2009), and the unions 
often try to ensure that a collective agreement is signed before privatisation and 
entered as an obligation for future owners into the sales contract. 
However, in the early stages of privatisation the main focus is the survival of the 
firm, and unions understand it as their job to protect company assets and maintain 
production. Only in 2008 the metalworking branch of the Confederation of 
Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia negotiated around twenty deals with the 
government on subsidies or debt restructuring to keep companies operational and 
more attractive to buyers. In this, unions often try to tailor the offers to what they 
consider to be the right kind of owners – including cases when they insisted on lower 
sale prices to make the company affordable for “strategic partners” and avoid 
speculators (SMS, 2007). In the meantime, however, the bread-and-butter issues of 
workers’ welfare are postponed until the company is privatised. Many companies in 
this situation report that they do have a collective agreement, which is not 
implemented due to financial problems (SMS, 2008). Wage arrears are common, as 
are derogations of wages to the minimum wage over extended periods of time. 
Protests are much less common, and when they do happen they often entail 
demands on the government to “speed up” privatisation (SMS, 2008). 
In the second group we find companies that have been recently privatised, and 
where the relations with employers tend to be the most explosive. On the one hand, 
as noted before, unions try to impose many demands on the new owners through the 
sales contract, fearing that later on they will have less power to influence the terms of 
bargain. However, these terms are often too onerous for the new owners, and 
breaches of contracts related to employment and collective agreements are very 
frequent (SMS, 2009). On the other hand, Serbia has an impressive track record of 
failed or fraudulent privatisations – according to the Agency for Privatisation, sales 
contracts were annulled for 25% out of 2500 companies privatised since 2002. This 
only raises unions’ suspicions towards new owners, as well as their insistence on the 
fulfilment of all provisions set by the sales contract. Moreover, because recently 
privatised companies are anyway supervised by the Agency for Privatisation, which 
can exert credible pressure (through the threat of cancelling the contract), unions feel 
empowered do demand their rights. This can strain relations with the new employers: 
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in 2007, in a survey of 42 privatised and non-privatised firms in the metal working 
sector, the Autonomous Trade Union of Metalworkers registered 12 demands for 
reassessment of implementation of the sales contract. Between 2002 and 2009, 48 
sales contracts in metalworking have been annulled (out of 244), at least one third 
due to breaches of collective agreements, redundancy pacts and other labour-related 
provisions (SMS, 2009).   
In spite of frequent conflicts, unions’ strategies in recently privatised companies 
are also marked by certain ambivalence, between the desire to protect workers’ 
welfare and fear that if the privatisation fails the company might be liquidated. 
“Trayal”, a tyre producer from central Serbia privatised in 2006, saw five strikes 
between mid-2008 and mid-2009, with workers complaining about 
underemployment, wage arrears and breaches of the terms of collective agreement 
which stipulated, among other, relatively high severance payments for redundant 
workers. However, on two occasions during the same period the unions supported 
owners’ request for the extension of legal deadlines for the fulfilment of investment 
obligations to preserve the sale contract. Thus, even though the unions appear most 
active and militant in recently privatised companies, the range of issues they are 
concerned with is actually very limited, focusing almost exclusively on proper 
execution of redundancy programmes regular wage payment. Given the employment 
situation, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the requests for wage increases are much 
more rare, and are almost never a cause of conflict: in July 2009, out of some 32 000 
workers who were on strike in the manufacturing sector 70% protested payment 
arrears, but not one protest was staged to demand raises, although wages in 
manufacturing are well below the national average (around 80%). 
 Finally, the third group of companies consists of newly created private firms 
or those that are no longer supervised by Agency for Privatisation. Here the union 
activity is at its lowest, and the data about collective bargaining is very scarce. Public 
protests or strikes are rare, although some firms have experienced conflicts shortly 
after privatisation. A good example is US Steel Serbia, where the workers staged a 
strike a few months after privatisation, demanding higher wages, a collective 
agreement and guarantees for the investment programme (Scherrer, 2003). After a 
month of protests the strike was settled through a wage increase which brought the 
hourly rates in line with the sectoral average. The company experienced no conflicts 
since, and the president of trade union confederation “Nezavisnost” recently dubbed 
the collective agreement at US Steel “the best one in Serbia” (Interview RFR, 2009). 
It is possible that unions are not very active in firms where standards are higher than 
elsewhere in the sector, which is a pattern familiar from other East European 
transition countries (see especially Ost, 2005; Ost and Crowley, 2001). However, 
even where workers are not entirely satisfied, unions emphasise the need to “learn 
how to deal with “real” owners” (UGS Nezavisnost, 2006) and that they “cannot 
afford confrontation” with private owners (SMS, 2007). 
A review of collective agreements in the sector indeed demonstrates that the 
remarkable docility of workers in private companies is not always due to their being 
well off, as clear examples were found of collective agreements which set very low 
working standards (including wages), sometimes even below the legally prescribed 
minimum. This is to a large extent due to the fact that the collective bargaining 
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process is extremely decentralised and there is virtually no coordination across the 
sector. Company-level agreements are neither published nor systematically registered 
by the unions, and there is little data on the coverage or content of these agreements. 
As one union official admitted, the union only finds out about them “when 
something goes wrong” (Interview GSM, 2009). 
Nevertheless, based on the sample we collected through company unions, some 
conclusions can be drawn about the issues involved in collective bargaining in private 
firms. We found that these agreements are as a rule less detailed a less generous than 
those in the public sector, especially regarding non-wage “status-related” issues such 
as holidays, paid and unpaid leave and small financial perks such as gifts for special 
occasions (state and religious holidays, anniversaries etc.). On the other hand, they 
contain more liberal provisions on working time and within-firm mobility (including 
for jobs requiring lower levels of qualification). What comes across very clearly when 
comparing these agreements to the labour code is that the unions seem most 
interested in issues that could be “monetised”, i.e. increasing compensation for 
overtime and night work, ensuring payment of transportation costs and daily meal 
allowances etc. The trend is observable even with regard to health and safety at work, 
where the agreements usually refer to the minimum set in the labour code, but 
occasionally set special wage bonuses for high-risk jobs. By contrast, working time 
arrangements appear to be entirely uncontroversial – while some agreements set 
provisions for continuous work process or working time accounts, others simply 
state that these issues will be “regulated by the employer as necessary”. This 
observation is confirmed by a report by the Labour Inspectorate, which found that 
about 80% of the firms they visited in 2008 had no working time regulation and 
employers didn’t keep records on overtime work. 
 
Protected Sectors in Poland and Serbia 
 
Poland 
Both in education and health care, wage issues featured high on Polish unions’ 
bargaining agenda. In view of the persistent gap between remuneration levels in 
public and private sectors, it was a priority for public sector unions to seek salary 
increases. When their wage demands were not met, unions would often recourse to 
protest actions. The most prominent example of a sustained, coordinated protest was 
the occupational strike of medical personnel in late spring 2007, which for a few 
weeks transformed the area adjacent to the President’s chancellery into a “White 
Village” of nurses demanding pay hikes. Similar claims have been formulated by 
unions in the education sector. Importantly, unions did not only push for pay 
increases for particular occupational groups, but they also lobbied the government to 
provide more funding for whole sectors. In healthcare, for instance, unions regularly 
called for financial relief for indebted hospitals, but also for higher sums for servicing 
individual patients within the system of contracts concluded between medical entities 
and regional units of the National Health Fund (NFZ, Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia). 
Similarly, education unions demanded that more money was spent on public 
education. Finally, public sector unions resolutely defended their rights to participate 
in regular consultations over pay increases with responsible governmental bodies. A 
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recent attempt to deprive education sector unions of this privilege met with a strong 
negative reaction of teachers’ unions, which forced the government abandoned plans 
to change the existing regulation. 
Concerning non-wage issues, at least two items on the collective bargaining 
agenda in protected industries merit closer attention. First, education and healthcare 
unions have actively engaged in a debate over the government’s plans to privatise the 
two branches. Throughout the 2000s, healthcare unions staged regular strikes against 
the transformation of public healthcare institutions into commercial entities. 
According to labour activists, the privatisation of medical care would have a number 
of negative consequences. Not only would it jeopardise indebted hospitals and cut 
off poor people’s access to medical services, but it would also deprive medical 
personnel of the commercialised entities of rights and benefits enjoyed under the 
public management. After five years of recurring struggles and waves of medical 
personnel’s protests both at the national and local levels, in May 2008 the Parliament 
suspended the preparation of the privatisation bill.  
A similar privatisation debate took place in education. Unions failed to preclude 
the creation of private schools - they considered private education entities as 
competitors that could potentially undermine public school teachers’ remuneration 
and working conditions. In public debates, they raised concerns over teaching 
standards in private schools and used the quality argument in discussions on the draft 
version of the services Directive (also known as the Bolkestein Directive), an initial 
version of which applied to the so-called serviced of general interests (SGI) such as 
healthcare or education. The biggest union in the sector, the Polish Teacher Union 
(Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego, ZNP), participated in Europe-wide 
manifestation against the draft EU legislation, seeking to prevent foreign education 
entities from entering Poland and underscoring the merits of publicly managed 
schools (ZNP, 2006a, 2006b). Similarly, in late 2007 the union boycotted the 
government’s bill on transformation of public schools into commercial entities. The 
union repeated its quality argument but also pointed to the potential loss of teachers’ 
benefits following privatisation. After protracted negotiations, in February 2008 the 
government changed its privatisation proposal. According to the revised draft, only 
entities with less than 70 pupils could be subject to commercialisation, and only if 
regional education control unit approved the plan (kuratorium oświaty).  
Another issue that triggered widespread protests of teacher unions was the 
government’s plan to phase out early retirement schemes enjoyed by education sector 
workers. A legislation enacted in 1998 foresaw that teachers would be able to make 
use of the early pension only till the end of 2008. After the wave of protests across 
the country in the first half of 2009, the government and ZNP agreed to prolong 
teachers’ retirement privileges to 2032; each year, however, a certain age group of 
teachers would be deprived of the early retirement option. The solution, known as 
the so-called ‘compensatory bill’, was not accepted by other unions representing the 
education sector, most notably Solidarność, which demanded an unconditional and 
unlimited preservation of teachers’ special pension rights. In the eyes of a ZNP 
official, however, the bill represented ‘the only solution’ (Interview ZNP, 2009) that 
could be negotiated in view of PSL-Civic Platform government’s offensive against 
early retirement schemes. 
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Last, but not least, working time issue was also an important item on public 
sector unions’ bargaining agenda. In the 2000s, the government intensified efforts to 
increase the number of working hours of healthcare and education sectors’ 
employees but the unions effective opposed the government’s plans. In education, 
for instance, unions convinced the Education Ministry that a debate over the 
possible extension of working hours should be preceded by an in-depth examination 
of actual time spent by teachers for preparation of courses and classes, which was to 
commence in late 2009.  
Apart from their considerable mobilisation potential, public sector unions were 
particularly skilful in politicising the matters subject to negotiations and used their 
political access to gain advantage during the collective bargaining process. During an 
interview with one of the authors, the Deputy President of the Polish Teachers’ 
Union acknowledged that his union found it easier to push through its demands in 
the wage and non-wage sphere when it had its representatives in the Parliament 
among MPs of the left-wing Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (Interview ZNP, 2009). 
But the political affiliation of public sector unions is a double-edged sword. First, 
while it makes it easier to build political alliances with ‘friendly’ governments, it 
impedes union-government communication at times when political parties 
representing different ideological standpoint are in power. For instance, social 
dialogue between the left-wing ZNP and the Education Minister Roman Giertych 
representing the conservative League of Polish families (LPR) was practically non-
existent. Second, it also makes it more difficult for trade unions siding with opposing 
political parties to come up with a common bargaining agenda. For this reason, the 
stances of the two most powerful trade unions in the educational sector, the left-
wing ZNP and right-wing Solidarność’s Health Section, have often diverged in recent 
years. In order to avoid shaky political alliances and ideological classifications, newly 
emerging labor organisations choose to concentrate purely on wage and non-wage 
demands. All-Poland Trade Union of Nurses and Midwives (Ogólnopolski Związek 
Zawodowy Pielęgniarek i Położnych, OZZPiP), affiliated at the Forum union 
federation, is an interesting example of a strong, independent trade union created in 
response to persistent financial problems of medical personnel and the healthcare 
sector as a whole, which strongly favours organising and direct mobilisation over 
political activism. 
 
Serbia 
Compared to manufacturing, Serbia’s protected sectors have been characterised 
by remarkable employment stability, in spite of the transition. As already noted, 
Serbia has lost about 40% of manufacturing employment during the 2000s, and 
overall employment fell by some 20% in the same period. In the meantime, the 
employment in health, education and public administration remained stable and even 
grew slightly. This allowed unions to focus on other issues, and indeed most union 
demands over the last decade focused almost exclusively on wages. This is especially 
true of health and education, where wages are among the lowest in the public sector 
(around 20-30% lower than in public administration and utilities), and about the 
average of the rest of the economy.  
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 Because of severe indebtedness and fiscal pressures that the Serbian state has 
been facing over the last decade such union demands have repeatedly opposed by the 
government, and frequently resulted in strikes and protests. In education, strikes or 
threats of strikes have become a regular occurrence at the beginning of every school 
year and towards the end of the first semester (when the budget is being defined for 
the coming year). These have kept the wage growth in education stable and above 
the level of inflation, but may have contributed to entrenchment of a pattern of 
weakly institutionalised social dialogue, where the government only concedes to work 
with unions when forced. This is even more evident in case of health, where unions 
have not been able to exert sustained pressure on the government, and the wage 
growth pattern has been significantly more irregular. In December 2002, about a 
hundred health workers, organised by the branch of “Independence” trade union 
came to Belgrade on foot from many parts of Serbia and camped in front of the 
Ministry of Health for over two weeks, eventually forcing the government to 
negotiate a substantial wage increase. A similar action occurred in 2007, when some 
10.000 union members protested outside the government buildings. On other 
occasions, however, when no public protests accompanied negotiations, the wages 
for this sector failed to exceed inflation.  
 Part of the reason that teachers’ unions seem to have a greater capacity to 
force the government into negotiation is structural: health workers have a much 
smaller recourse to strike, as their right to strike is regulated not only by the Law on 
Strikes, which prescribes extensive “minimum work process” while in protest, but 
also by a special government decree on strike in the health sector, which makes work 
stoppages nearly impossible, and which the government refused to repeal in spite of 
repeated calls from the unions. Unlike teachers, the health unions are also more 
cautious of alienating the public if they withdraw essential services, and their actions 
have thus been mostly limited to symbolic protests. Another part of the explanation 
probably lies with unions themselves. In education, after some initial bickering 
mainly on political grounds, the three representative trade unions have been very 
successful in coordinating their demands on the government. In health however, 
there has been some division over time along occupational lines, with separate 
unions being formed for doctors, nurses and non-medical personnel. Although the 
two central and most numerous confederations have tried to preserve unity and 
distribute the benefits across occupations, both doctors and non-medical personnel 
have staged separate campaigns to improve their lot, the former managing to 
persuade the unions to demand partial “decompression” of wages to allow greater 
gains for the top earners. Nevertheless, even though wage growth has been less 
regular, there is a clear tend towards the convergence of wage levels in health and 
education, as well as some evidence of “competitive benchmarking” between the two 
sectors, with wage demands in one sector being staged in response to increases in the 
other (Interview SZZS, 2009). 
 The difference in unions’ ability to push for certain demands in these two 
otherwise very similar sectors can also be observed with regard to non-wage issues. 
In the past decade, the most important such issues centred on the government 
efforts to “rationalise” the public sectors and, to a lesser degree, union demand for 
proper institutionalisation of collective bargaining. Under the pressure from the 
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International Monetary Fund, the Serbian government has attempted to reorganise 
and reduce the number of employees in the public sector since 2005. The 
programme offered by the government relied on voluntary redundancies offering 
“stimulating” severance payments about 20% higher than prescribed by the law, and 
the unions were involved in the selection process. The reform caused surprisingly 
little protest in the health sector, and around 15,000 employees left the hospitals in 
the next three years. Although it is true that health workers have more opportunities 
to withdraw to the private sector, the unions still maintain that this was a great 
sacrifice and insist that they will not cooperate on any further efforts to reduce 
employment (Interview SZZS, 2009). In education, however, the unions chose to 
ignore the programme. They insisted that the severance payments were not attractive 
enough and tried instead to limit new hires, forcing management to administer work 
sharing schemes and instead of hiring through public calls accept transfers of 
workers being made redundant in other educational institutions. In summer 2009, the 
government again proposed a reform of the educational system, which entails 
increasing the number of students per class and curbing employment, but agreed to 
amend certain provisions as teachers threatened that the school year will not begin 
until their objections were accepted. The reform was eventually approved, but the 
unions demanded that all funds saved through the employment cuts be used to 
increase wages of the remaining teachers (SOS, USPRS, GSPRS “Nezavisnost”, 
2009).  
Finally, health and education display a particularly stark difference when it comes 
to the very process of collective bargaining. Since early 2000s, teachers’ unions have 
regularly signed collective agreements, even if on occasion these had to be prodded 
along with threats of public protests. In health, however, no agreement was signed 
between 1999 and 2009, although the unions have been negotiating the new 
agreement with the ministry for almost four years. The greatest obstacle to 
agreement was the governments’ refusal to allow some wage-related issues into the 
agreement - or, as we referred to them above “monetised” non-wage issues. As 
wages in the public sector are negotiated separately, as part of the budget, collective 
bargaining serves almost exclusively to set the working standards and other non-wage 
issues. These, however, are remarkably generous: when compared to the private 
sector they provide for much longer holidays and other periods of time off (i.e. paid 
leave), often set up so-called “recreation and rehabilitation funds” for collective use, 
have greater training opportunities and strict protections of employment status (i.e. 
limiting inter-firm mobility, restricting use of time accounts etc.), as well as 
provisions for government-sponsored housing schemes. Here it is important to 
stress that even though health employees were not covered by a sector-level 
agreement throughout this period, company-level agreements remained in place 
(Interview SZZS, 2009), and they even succeeded on negotiating substantial non-
wage issues (such as housing schemes) and even some smaller perks outside of the 
framework of collective bargaining.  For instance, the “New Years’ present for 
employees” ceased to be an optional gesture to be agreed on the firm level and was 
moved onto the list of “budgetary issues”, amounting to a hefty sum of up to one 
third of the average wage in the sector. In a sense, even thought the scope of 
bargaining in the public sector is much broader, some of the traits observed in the 
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private sector are reproduced here, notably the trend towards “monetisation” of non-
wage issues. Most strikingly, perhaps, in education even the union matters have 
become subject to this tendency. “Improving” the labour code of 2005 which states 
that employer should provide a certain number of paid hours off to the company 
union leadership for union business, the 2006 collective agreement in education 
stipulated “either 20 paid hours off or a wage increase of 12%”. Three years later, the 
agreement dispensed with paid hours entirely, offering only the option of wage 
increase. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we argued that trade unions have a significant potential to 
influence welfare reforms not just through political channels but also via their active 
participation in collective bargaining. This is because non-wage issues tackled during 
the negotiations are closely linked to the design of social policies, and the position of 
unions on these matters can either smooth or hinder the reform process. Although 
the literature suggests that labour in postcommunist countries has a limited potential 
to shape the collective bargaining agenda and influence social policy making, we 
argued that their bargaining power and the degree of influence on welfare state 
restructuring very much depends on the type of sector within which they operate. 
Throughout the examined period, Polish and Serbian unions in protected sectors 
were able to maintain their status and at times enhance their welfare both in terms of 
higher wages and better working conditions. Through the participation in collective 
bargaining, they have also had a significant impact on reducing the welfare state 
cutbacks. In contrast, private sector unions are lacking the organisational power to 
avoid undesired outcomes both in wage and non-wage sphere. It is worth noting that 
these sectoral differences are robust in both countries, despite their distinct 
communist legacies and difference in their current position in the international 
economic system.  
That being said, the evidence from the Serbian health care sector indicates that 
the final shape of the bargaining agenda and the extent to which unions are able to 
actively defend the welfare of their constituency might depend also on other factors. 
Unfavourable state regulation limiting collective action in a given sector or a high 
degree of fragmentation of trade union movement may considerably limit the 
salience of the structural variables. Despite relatively high unionisation levels and 
favourable positioning of their sector outside direct market pressures, Serbian health 
workers were much less successful in upholding their social status than their 
counterparts in education.  
Last, but not least, the above-outlined sectoral attributes are clearly not an 
exclusive prerogative of Central and Eastern Europe, and earlier studies showed that 
they play in important role in shaping Western European unions’ policy agenda (see, 
for instance, Swenson, 1985). At the same time, however, it seems that the cross-
sectoral differences are especially pronounced in CEE, due to large disparities in 
union strength and the specific traits of the privatisation process in CEE. In the case 
of exposed sectors, well-documented weakness of sectoral union structures in CEE 
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(Ghellab and Vaughan-Whitehead, 2004) makes company-level organisations 
particularly vulnerable to employers’ cost-cutting and productivity-boosting 
pressures. Consequently, they are much more restricted than their Western European 
counterparts in their ability to push for pay hikes, let alone welfare-enhancing 
measures. At the same time, privatisation of public services in CEE has been 
advancing relatively slowly, which allowed unions in the protected sector to protect 
collective rights and privileges of their constituencies. As the privatisation trends 
intensify, however, unions in the public sectors might find it increasingly difficult to 
uphold their constituencies’ welfare and influence their countries’ social policies via 
collective bargaining. 
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